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FROM OPPORTUNITY TO STATUS
Milton R. Konvitz
When Ronald Knox, at the age of four, was asked what he did 
for his insomnia, he replied, "I lie awake and think about the 
past." I suspect that even the future celebrated biblical scholar 
did not, at the age of four, have much of a past to think about-- 
unless, with Plato and Wordsworth, we believe that a child is not 
born in entire forgetfulness, but comes trailing clouds of glory.
In my own case when I lie awake and think about the past, I do have 
a relatively long past to think about--it is thirty-eight years 
since I began my teaching career, and almost thirty years since I 
came to Cornell.
And when I think of the American past I have seen and 
experienced, what strikes me as the most important development, 
in a span of years that saw countless significant events, is the 
great expansion of democratization: the incommensurably greater
acceptance of religious and racial differences, and the recognition 
won by numerous classes of disadvantaged persons to their right of 
human dignity and of legal and social equality.
In 1945, the year in which the School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations first opened its doors, the president of Dartmouth,
E. M. Hopkins, justified a quota for Jewish students by emphasizing 
that "Dartmouth is a Christian college founded for the Christianization 
of its students." In defending a numerous clausus for Jewish 
students, Hopkins was only echoing the statements made by A.
Lawrence Lowell, president of Harvard, when in 1922 he proposed a 
quota system for Jewish students. The quota fortunately was
1
2rejected by a Harvard faculty committee in 1923, though by all 
accounts the quota system survived at Harvard and at other leading 
institutions of higher learning through secretely operated 
techniques. I cite these instances for their symbolic value, 
for they provide us with an easy measure of the distance the 
American people have traveled in the last fifty, or even the last 
thirty, years. In all their long history, extending over 
thousands of years, in no other country and at no other time have 
Jews enjoyed so much of the precious commodities of liberty and 
equality as they have in the United States in the last three 
decades.
Similar judgments can be expressed with respect to Roman 
Catholics in the United States. Perhaps no single event in 
American history so dramatically articulated the change in status 
and dignity of the Roman Catholics as the election of John F.
Kennedy as president in 1960. His election for the first time made a 
reality of the provision in Article VI of the Constitution 
that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification 
for public office, and of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment.
In the 1930s and 1940s the Jehovah's Witnesses were 
harassed and persecuted in many parts of the country, where an 
open season on them seemed to have been declared. But by 1946 
the United States Supreme Court had decided fifteen cases, 
brought by the sect, in its favor--more than the total of all 
cases on religious liberty decided by the Court in its first 150 
years. These decisions, which rested on broad free speech and 
religious liberty grounds, effectively put an end to religious 
persecution of any unpopular denomination or sect, and established 
precedents that have been helpful to all exposed, unpopular causes.
3In recent years these momentous achievements have been over­
shadowed by the great gains made against racial discrimination 
and segregation, especially with the decision in Brown v. Board 
of Education in 1954 and its progeny; and the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972; and the decision of the Supreme Court in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. in 1971.
While we all recognize that much remains to be done about the 
income, unemployment, and occupational distribution of blacks, it 
is important to note that of the 140 other member states of the 
United Nations, not one can compare with the United States in the 
legal rights to equality enjoyed by our racial minorities, or the 
great progress that has been made toward political, social, and 
economic equality in the last several decades. Three measures 
of our achievement can be cited: One is that while there were
hundreds of cases attacking racial segregation in places of 
public accommodation before enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, today there is hardly one such case--the ultimate denial 
of human dignity no longer defaces our country. Another measure 
is to be found in the greatly enhanced political status of blacks 
as voters in the South and as public officials throughout the 
United States. But perhaps the most telling measure is to be 
seen in the fact that today concentration is not on the elimination 
of present discrimination in employment, but on remedying the 
effects of past discrimination.
Labor unions are now so much a part of the conventional American 
scene that we tend to forget that little more than forty years ago, 
before Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, 
students of labor law or labor history had to spend much of their time
studying the law of criminal conspiracy. Today labor law is a 
major independent branch of American jurisprudence and is a 
subject taught and studied in every law school. In 1935 trade 
unions had a membership of less than four million; at present the 
membership is twenty million. Not so long ago, one would hardly 
have discussed unionization of public employees, or of agricultural 
workers, or of professional groups. Today unionization of such 
persons is no longer one of the world's seven wonders. At the 
time of the passage of the Wagner Act, we read the shocking 
revelations of the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee, which 
exposed the wholesale violations of the workingman's legal and 
constitutional rights; in the 1970s we read about the success, 
wealth, and power of organized labor. Then the concern was that 
organized labor would be a force for socialism or radicalism; now 
the concern is that organized labor is a conservative force that 
retards economic and social development.
These have been our greatest gains: the elevation of all 
religious denominations and sects, of all racial minorities, and of 
all blue-collar and white-collar workers into a status that entitles 
them to equal dignity and equal rights. But there have been many 
other notable gains, which we can mention only briefly.
Whether the Equal Rights Amendment will become part of the 
Constitution, women in the last ten years have in fact won a 
larger measure of equal rights by legislation and court decisions 
than Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott had ever thought 
possible when they planned the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848.
For some seventy years, beginning with our Chinese exclusion 
laws and extending through the notorious immigration quota laws of 
the 1920s, the United States openly declared that millions of 
Americans who had their roots in Asia or in Eastern or Central
5Europe were men of lower breed and lower caste. But in 1952 our 
new Immigration and Nationality Act ended all racial and color bars 
on naturalization, and all color and racial discrimination in our 
immigration policy.
In this context we might note the great change that has come 
about in the legal status of our aliens. States excluded aliens 
from the professions and from many types of work. New York, for 
instance, had more such restrictive laws than any other state.
In twenty-six states aliens were excluded from old-age benefits, 
seven states denied aid to blind aliens, and Congress in its 1938 
legislation, providing public employment as a form of relief, 
excluded aliens from its benefits. In the last several years all 
this has been changed radically. The break came in 1971 in a 
decision of the Supreme Court, in which the laws excluding aliens 
from the right to welfare were declared unconstitutional as a 
denial of equal protection. The Court, for the first time, held 
that a classification based on alienage is inherently suspect and 
is, therefore, subject to close judicial scrutiny. An example of 
how far the new judicial solicitude for aliens has been carried is 
the Supreme Court's decision of 1973 denying Connecticut the right 
to exclude an alien from taking the state's bar examination. The 
state, said the Court, may require an oath to support the United 
States and the state's constitution, but aliens as a class cannot 
be held ineligible to take such an oath in good faith.
In this connection, too, we would mention the new right won 
for bilingualism. The monopolistic position traditionally and 
legally enjoyed by English came to an end with the enactment of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided that anyone who had 
attended any public or private school in which the predominant 
language was one other than English, may not be denied the right
6to vote because of an inability to read, write, or understand 
the English language. The spirit of this provision is now being 
felt in many public schools and public offices, and is a 
significant aspect of the renewal of the spirit of cultural 
pluralism and ethnic diversity that we had tended to suppress.
No longer is it possible for a president of the United States to 
speak scornfully, as did Theodore Roosevelt, of "hyphenated 
Americanism," or to say, as did Woodrow Wilson, that "the most 
unAmerican thing in the world is a hyphen."
The poor who are on welfare are another large category of 
persons whom we had tended not to see; they were nonpersons, without 
legal status and without rights. Today, let it be noted to our 
credit, the picture is quite different. The first important 
breakthrough came in 1969, in the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Shapiro v. Thompson. The two states involved in that case 
and the District of Columbia required a year's residence to 
qualify for welfare. The Court held that the waiting period 
requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause and also 
infringed the constitutional right to travel. The language of 
the Court's opinion went, however, beyond the strict necessities 
of the decision. A state, said the Court, may not fence out 
indigents who are seeking to better their life. Persons may move 
because of the promise of better schools, of a better environment, 
of better business or professional opportunities. Why may not a 
mother consider better welfare benefits? Does she not have a right 
to seek a better life for herself and her dependent children?
In the following year the Court held that welfare recipients 
have a constitutional right to due process when the state proceeds 
to terminate or suspend their benefits. They are then entitled to 
an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to have
7an attorney, to present their own evidence, and to have an impartial 
decision maker, whose conclusions must rest solely on legal rules and 
evidence. In an important footnote the Court said that welfare 
entitlements today are more like "property" than a "gratuity"; 
for much of existing wealth does not fall into common law concepts. 
Doctors, for example, have their licenses, car dealers their 
franchises, workers their union memberships and union contracts.
The government is the source of many entitlements, such as routes 
for airlines, channels for television stations, and social security 
pensions. They are not forms of charity or gratuities. Why should 
only the entitlements of the poor be an exception? Could a church 
be deprived of tax exemption without the protection offered by the 
Due Process Clause? Could a public employee be dismissed without 
due process? The termination of welfare involves, said the Court, 
important benefits, which cannot constitutionally be disposed of 
by referring to them as privileges rather than rights.
These and other cases--by now there are hundreds of cases in 
state and federal courts--have introduced a new area of 
jurisprudence in American law: the law of poverty. Courses in
this subject are offered in all major law schools. Just as there 
is Corporation Law, so today there is also Poverty Law. Much of 
the gap that existed for millenia between the Old Testament 
concept of vested rights in the poor and the Anglo-American idea 
that relief is a gratuity that is to be doled out resentfully and 
grudgingly has now, to a remarkable degree, been bridged by these 
new legal developments. The result is that individuals on welfare 
are no longer pariahs, but enjoy the constitutional status of 
persons with entitlements which the law must protect.
Then there are the millions of young Americans who have quite 
suddenly, within the last few years, won a place for themselves
8within the confines of the United States Constitution. By the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, eighteen-year-old 
citizens may vote. The Supreme Court in 1969 for the first 
time held that students do not shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse gate, and in January 
1975 the Court held that students facing temporary suspension 
from public school were entitled to protection under the Due 
Process Clause. Hundreds of cases have challenged school 
authorities on their 1ength-of-hair regulations and dress codes, 
and in at least twenty-six states such challenges have been 
successful.
Finally, recent decisions of the Supreme Court have 
vindicated the constitutional rights, either under the Equal 
Protection or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
of illegitimate children, of inmates of mental institutions, and 
of prisoners; all are individuals whom society had, with shocking 
casualness, swept under the rug.
In the administration of prisons, wardens are limited by the 
commands of the Due Process Clause and by the Eighth Amendment's 
ban on cruel and unusual punishments, and prisoners have not 
forfeited their religious liberty, or their right to free 
communication and access to the courts.
In June 1975 the Supreme Court, in the Donaldson case, held 
that nondangerous mentally ill persons, confined in mental hospitals 
against their will, have a right to treatment or to their freedom. 
While the full implications of this decision are as yet undetermined, 
the Court's opinion goes a long way to bring under the light of the 
law tens if not hundreds of thousands of individuals whose families 
and whom society had been eager to forget.
9In a series of cases that started in 1968, the Supreme Court 
has wiped out as unconstitutional differences in legal status 
between children born out of wedlock and those born legitimately.
The state, the Court has said, has an interest in furthering 
legitimate family life, but, the Court asked, will persons shun 
illicit relationships because the offspring may not one day reap the 
same benefits which the law allows to children born within the 
confines of wedlock? No children, said the Court, are responsible 
for their own births; penalizing them for the conditions under 
which they were conceived is both ineffectual and unjust.
All these developments are gains for moral sensitivity, because, 
as was said by Archbishop William Temple in his Gifford Lectures, 
"morality is the discovery or recognition by persons of personality 
in others, to whom by the common attribute of personality they are 
bound in the ties of community membership." In the last several 
decades, despite McCarthyism, the cold war and the Vietnam War, 
increased crime rates, and Watergate, there has been constitutional 
and moral progress. We have learned to apply commonly accepted 
constitutional and moral principles to individuals and groups whom 
we had hitherto condemned as being beyond the pale, beyond the 
reach of the phrase in the Preamble of the Constitution, "We, the
people---" Emma Lazarus' poem inscribed on the Statue of Liberty
spoke to the people of other continents: "Give me," the woman 
holding the torch of liberty was made to say to the peoples of 
Europe and of other continents,
...your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me.
Now we have begun to turn the Statue of Liberty around, so that 
its message is to be read as addressed to ourselves. For at long 
last we have begun to see that it is we who have huddled masses 
who yearn to be free and that it is our own teeming cities that 
have wretched refuse who wait for liberation.
